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.
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, EDUCATION, AND PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 
Richard S. Myers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
There have long been battles in the United States over 
education. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, we 
have experienced contentious battles over the proper 
relationship between the state and parents in controlling the 
education of children.2 In recent years, this controversy has 
played out in the area of education relating to sexual morality. 3 
One of the principal emerging controversies today involves 
teaching about same-sex marriage.4 
I am not sanguine about an easy solution. Fortunately, we 
do not have the sort of violent controversies we had in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, 5 but the current debates are 
often fractious and typically result in the subordination of 
* Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Lynn Wardle 
for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and to the Symposium participants for 
a stimulating conference. 
1. I have addressed some of these issues in prior writings. See, e.g, Richard S. 
Myers, The Right to Conscience and the First Amendment, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123 
(2010) [hereinafter, Myers, Conscience]; l{ichard S. Myers, School Choice: The 
Constitutional Issues, 8 CATH. Soc. SCI. I{EV. 167 (2003) [hereinafter Myers, School 
Choice]; Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Teaching of Civic Virtue in the Public 
Schools, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. I{EV. 6:3 (1996) [hereinafter Myers, Civic Virtue]; Richard 
S. Myers, A Comment on the Death of Lemon, 1:3 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 90:3 (199:3); 
l{ichard S. Myers, Curriculum in the Public Schools: The Need for an Emphasis on 
Parental Control, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 4:31 (1990) [hereinafter Myers, Parental Control]. 
To avoid multiplying footnotes, I will not provide a citation in every case in which I 
have drawn from my prior work. 
2. Myers, Parental Control, supra note 1, at 132. 
3. See, e.!{., Emily .J. Brown, Note, When Insiders Become Outsiders: Parental 
Objections to Public School Sex Education Programs, 59 DUKE L. J. 109 (2009). 
1. See generally Symposium, The Impact of Same-Sex Marriaue on Education, 
2011 BYU Enuc. & L.J. 126 (2011). 
5. See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 119 (1999). 
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parental and religious rights.6 This is troubling because my 
approach to these issues begins with the presumption that 
parents have the primary authority and responsibility to 
control the education of their children.7 
A major reason for the current situation, which I regard as 
unsatisfactory, is due to some basic deficiencies in our 
approach to education. We tend to view state education as the 
baseline and that exceptions ought to be narrow (and perhaps 
only reserved for fringe groups such as the Amish) because 
exceptions threaten the public schools,s which the Supreme 
Court has characterized as the symbol of our democracy. 9 This 
approach fails to accord a proper respect for parental rights. 
The current approach is heavily weighted towards the exercise 
of state power. We need to recognize the inevitability of 
compulsion in the public schools. 10 We also need to recognize 
that the near monopoly of public funding for the public schools 
interferes with the choices of those parents who would like to 
choose private schools or home education. 11 
I will begin by exploring the legal issues presented when 
parents object to teaching relating to same-sex marriage in the 
public schools. Despite some court decisions that have accorded 
constitutional protection to parental rights in the context of 
education, 12 the case law makes it clear that parents have very 
little ability (at least as a matter of federal constitutional law) 
to object to the public school curriculum. 13 Although this 
conclusion runs against my policy preferences, I think the 
current law is a proper interpretation of the relevant federal 
constitutional provisions. 
The federal Constitution does not provide any significant 
protection for parental rights. I will explore this by examining 
6. See Myers, Sehoul Choice, supra note 1, at 169. 
7. See, e.g., Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 176. 
8. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, :332 F.3d 1:31, 111 (2d Cir. 200:l); Brown v. 
Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.:)d 525, 5:H (1st Cir. 1995). 
9. The Supreme Court has characterized the public schools as "'at once the 
symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common 
destiny."' Edwards v. Aguillard, 182 U.S. 578, 581 (1987) (quoting McCollum v. Bel. of 
Educ., :133 U.S. 20:3, 2:11 (1918)). 
10. See Myers, School Choice, supra noted, at 168-69. 
11. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 170-75. 
12. See Wisconsin v. Yoder. 106 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U. 
S. 5:31 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. cl90 (192:3). 
1:1. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 169-70. 
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cases addressing free exercise and due process arguments. The 
principal focus of the paper will be parental rights to control 
their children's education. I will briefly discuss older cases, 14 
but the main focus will be on recent cases such as Parker v. 
Hurley. 15 These recent cases give very little protection to 
parental rights. I will evaluate these developments from two 
perspectives. First, I will analyze these decisions as a matter of 
federal constitutional law. Second, I will discuss the problems 
that this law creates and will, in conclusion, suggest how the 
current, unsatisfactory situation can be improved. 
Because of the deficiencies in the federal constitutional law, 
it is necessary to explore other ways to protect parent choices. 
One way to do this is to broaden the debate. We really need to 
think more broadly about whether parents or the state ought to 
have the principal control over education and we cannot do 
that by narrowly focusing on the curriculum in the public 
schools. We need to also think about educational funding. 
Perhaps the current controversies over the contentious issue of 
same-sex marriage will prompt an increased focus on these 
broader issues and will lead to an increased appreciation of 
parental rights, subsidiarity, and a genuine pluralism in 
education. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The government was not very active m the area of 
education until the 1820s-1840s. The common school 
movement of that era was a conscious effort to mold children in 
the philosophy of those in charge of the educational system. 16 
There was a particular concern to bring those of minority faiths 
(and here the particular concern was about Catholics) into the 
societal mainstream. This was enormously controversial, 17 but 
after about the middle of the nineteenth century we have had a 
more or less stable set of affairs. I do not want to suggest that 
there were not controversies. It is true, however, that the 
disputes were worked out without the influence of federal 
constitutional law. The public schools have been basically 
14. Pierce, 268 U.S. 5:l1; Meyer, 262 U.S. :l90. 
15. 511 F.:ld 87 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008). 
16. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 167. 
17. !d. 
306 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2011 
Protestant schools for most of their history. 1x There were some 
controversies over religious activities in public schools and 
state courts sometimes protected the rights of religious 
dissenters. 19 But the main remedy for those parents who were 
unhappy with the public schools was for the parents to exercise 
the option of avoiding the public schools altogether. That is 
why Catholic immigrants made such enormous sacrifices to 
establish the parochial school system.20 
The United States Constitution did not play much of a role 
in these debates until the Court incorporated the Religion 
Clauses in the middle of the twentieth century. 21 The school 
prayer cases of the early 1960s accelerated the move to a 
secular-as opposed to a Protestant-government school 
system.22 Most of the cases have dealt with efforts to ensure 
that all traces of religion are banished from the public schools. 
I think that most of these cases were properly decided, in large 
part because there is a very real risk of coercion in the public 
school setting.23 
But to a significant degree, these cases (involving in recent 
years things such as the Pledge of Allegiance and moment of 
silence laws24) are a distraction from the real issues presented 
by an increasingly secular school system. These cases do not 
deal with the most serious interferences with parental rights. 
These interferences occur when parents have objected to the 
18. Jd. See also .John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the 
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. l{~;v. 279. 297 (20()1) ("For most of its history, 
public education in America had been unabashedly patriotic and unmistakably 
Protestant."). 
19. See V!TERIT'l'l, supra note 5, at 150; .Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 18, at :301. 
20. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 167. 
21. See l~verson v. Bd. of Educ., :3:30 U.S. 1 (1917); Cantwell v. Connecticut. :no 
U.S. 296 (1910). 
22. See Abington Township v. Schempp, ::374 U.S. 20:l (196:l); Engel v. Vitak :no 
U.S. 421 (1962). See also Jeffries & Hyan, supra note 18, at :l18--27; Myers. School 
Choice, supra note 1, at 167-68. 
2:3. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 168. The courts have sometimes gone 
too far. See id. (mentioning Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (graduation prayer) 
and Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 5:!0 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer at high school 
football games) as examples of cases that went too far in excluding ndigion from the 
public schools). 
21. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 2:3487 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 201 0) (upholding the constitutionality of a New 
Hampshire statute that requires that public schools authoriw a period during the day 
for students to voluntarily recite the Pledge of Allegiann~); Sherman v. Koch. 62:3 F.:ld 
501 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that requires a 
mandatory period of silence in the puhlic schools). 
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public schools either in whole or in part, and it 1s to these 
situations that I now turn. 
Supreme Court decisions in the 1920s did protect the rights 
of parents to opt out of the public school system altogether and 
to retain some control over private education. In Meyer u. 
Nebraska, 25 the Court held unconstitutional a Nebraska 
statute that made it illegal to teach a subject in a language 
other than English in any school, private or public. The Court 
found that the statute violated the due process clause because 
it unreasonably interfered with the right of the teacher to 
pursue his occupation and the rights of parents to control the 
education of their children. The Court noted "[t]hat the State 
may do much, go very far indeed, in order to improve the 
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally[,] ... 
[but also noted that] the individual has certain fundamental 
rights which must be respected."26 Although it found a 
constitutional violation in Meyer, the Court did acknowledge 
"[t]he power of the State to compel attendance at some school 
and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a 
requirement that they shall give instructions in English ... :m 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,28 the Court held 
unconstitutional an Oregon statute that required children 
between eight and sixteen to attend public schools. The Court 
found that the statute violated the due process clause because 
it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control."29 Justice McReynolds stated: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power 
of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to 
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not 
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 30 
25. 262 U.S. :190 (192:1). 
26. Jd. at 101. 
27. /d. at 102. 
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
29. Jd. at 5J1-:l5. 
JO. Jd. at 5:15. 
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The Court, however, did not recognize an absolute due 
process right of parents to control the education of their 
children. The Pierce Court noted: 
No question is raised concerning the power of the State 
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and 
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all 
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall 
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that 
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be 
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly 
inimical to the public welfare. 31 
In 1972, in Wisconsin u. Yoder, 32 the Court held that 
Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law (which required 
children between seven and sixteen to attend school) was 
unconstitutional as applied to Amish parents who refused to 
send their children to public schools after they completed the 
eighth grade. The Court did rely on the parental rights 
recognized in Meyer and Pierce, but most of the Court's focus 
was on the free exercise claim presented by the Amish 
parents. 33 Although the Court's ruling is considered a high-
water mark of protection for free exercise of religion, 34 the 
opinion was quite narrow. 35 The Court acknowledged the power 
of the state to enact compulsory school-attendance laws and to 
promulgate reasonable educational standards. The Court's 
ruling seemed limited to the Amish. 
Despite these rulings, the modern cases involving parental 
rights in the area of education have generally been decided in 
favor of the power of the state. I will limit myself to a few of 
many examples. 
In Mozert u. Hawkins County Board of Education,36 the 
district court held that a public school requirement that all 
31. Jd. at 5::31. 
:12. 106 u .8. 205 (1972). 
:3:3. See id. at 21:3-14. 
:H. Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free J.:xercise of Religion, 57 CLEY. ST. L. i{EV. 
49:3, 501 (2009). 
:35. See Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 127. See also Parker v. Hurley, 5J!I 
F.:ld. 87, 100 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Tellingly, Yoder emphasized that its holding was 
essentially sui gcneris, as few sects could make a similar showing of a unique and 
demanding religious way of life that is fundamentally incompatihle with any schooling 
system.''). 
:36. 617 F. Supp. 1191 (E. D. Tenn. 1986) (Mozert /), ret!'d, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
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students in first through eighth grades use a prescribed set of 
reading textbooks violated the constitutional rights of the 
objecting parents and students. The court entered an 
injunction that required the schools to excuse objecting 
students from participating in reading classes where the 
textbooks were used and awarded the parents more than 
$50,000 in damages. The plaintiffs had a variety of objections 
to the reading series. Specifically, the plaintiffs believed that 
the reading series taught "evolution, moral relativism, 
internationalism (rather than patriotism), witchcraft, and 
idolatry, and also 'denigrated the differences between the 
sexes,' and disparaged parental control of children."37 The 
district court clearly held that "the [parents] believe that they 
must not allow their children to be exposed to the content of 
the [reading] series," and that "plaintiffs' religious beliefs 
compel them to refrain from exposure to the [reading] series."38 
Despite these clear holdings, the Sixth Circuit reversed, 
holding: 
[T]he requirement that public school students study a basal 
reader series chosen by the school authorities does not create 
an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise Clause 
when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief 
to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or 
required by their religion. 39 
Even if the courts find that some aspect of the public school 
curriculum creates a burden, the courts are far too quick to 
accept the argument that the state's interest is strong enough 
to outweigh the harm to the parents and the students. For 
example, that was the position taken by one of the concurring 
opinions in Mozert. The opinion agreed with evidence presented 
at trial that "mandatory participation in reading classes using 
the Holt series or some similar readers is essential to 
accomplish" the state's objective of teaching students how to 
think critically about complex and controversial subjects and to 
develop their own ideas and make judgments about these 
:n. George W. Dent, ,Jr., Reli~Iious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. HEY. 
86:3, k66 (1988) (describing the Mozert plaintiffs' allegations). 
:38. Mozert I, 617 I( Supp. at 1198, 1200. 
:39. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (Mozert II), 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th 
Cir. 1987). 
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subjects, "and that this interest could not be achieved any other 
way."40 
In fact, some of the more extravagant statements in this 
opinion are difficult to square with the existence of private 
schools. If the state does have a compelling interest in 
mandatory participation in a program of this sort, it is difficult 
to imagine how the state could allow students to be educated in 
private schools or in the home. It is one thing to say that the 
state has an interest in an educated citizenry. It is quite 
another to say that the state has the primary educational 
responsibility, a responsibility that is superior to parental 
judgments about the kind of upbringing their children receive. 
The other concurring opinion in Mozert found that 
mandatory participation in the reading series did constitute a 
burden and rejected the view that the state had a compelling 
interest in its reading program that could not be accomplished 
by any other means. Yet, in the end, this judge concluded that 
there had not been a free exercise violation because the 
plaintiffs had the constitutionally protected option of choosing 
a private school. As the judge put it, "the school board is 
entitled to say, 'my way or the highway.'"41 
The First Circuit's 1995 decision in Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and 
Safer Productions, Inc. is to the same effect.42 In Brown, two 
minors and their parents brought suit after the children were 
compelled to attend a sexually explicit AIDS and sex education 
program conducted at their public high school.43 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the program advocated and approved oral sex, 
homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during 
promiscuous premarital sex.44 The district court dismissed the 
complaint and the First Circuit affirmed.45 The court of 
appeals' conclusion was based on the view that although 
parents generally have the right to control the education of 
their children, that right could not be construed to interfere 
with the government's decisions about the curriculum.46 The 
court stated: 
10. ld. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
41. ld. at 1071 (Boggs, J., concurring). 
12. 68 F.:3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) 
43. Id. at 529. 
14. Id. 
45. Id. at 5:30, 511. 
16. Id. at 5:31. 
2] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, EDUCATION 
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to 
dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the 
schools would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student 
whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the 
school's choice of subject matter. We cannot see that the 
Constitution imposes such a burden on state educational 
systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents ... do 
not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of 
information in the public schools.47 
311 
Nor, according to the court, did this program interfere with 
plaintiffs' free exercise of their religion.48 The plaintiffs' claim 
for damages was properly dismissed because "the plaintiffs 
[did] not allege that the one-time compulsory attendance at the 
Program threatened their entire way of life."49 
The First Circuit's decision in Parker u. Hurley is more of 
the same. 5° In Parker, there were two groups of plaintiffs. The 
court described the plaintiffs' contentions in this fashion: 
The Parkers object to their child being presented in 
kindergarten and first grade with two books that portray 
diverse families, including families in which both parents are 
of the same gender. The Wirthlins object to a second-grade 
teacher's reading to their son's class a book that depicts and 
celebrates a gay marriage. 51 
The plaintiffs did "not challenge the use of these books as 
part of a nondiscrimination curriculum in the public schools, 
but challenge the school district's refusal to provide them with 
prior notice and to allow for exemption from such 
instruction. "52 
The Parker court rejected the parents' free exercise and due 
process claims. With respect to the free exercise claim, the 
court stated: "While we accept as true plaintiffs' assertion that 
their sincerely held religious beliefs were deeply offended, we 
find that they have not described a constitutional burden on 
their rights, or on those of their children."53 The court 
distinguished Yoder because the Parker court did not think the 
17. !d. 
18. !d. at 5:l9. 
49. /d. 
50. 511 F.:ld H7 (1st Cir. 2008). 
51. /d. at 90. 
52. /d. 
5:3. /d. at 99. 
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plaintiffs in Parker had alleged the same devastating impact on 
their religion.54 According to the court, "[e]xposure to the 
materials in dispute here will not automatically and 
irreversibly prevent the parents from raising"55 their children 
in their religious beliefs. With respect to the due process claim, 
the court acknowledged that Supreme Court cases such as 
Meyer and Pierce had supported parental rights. The court 
found, though, that this parental right did not extend to 
"'direct[ing] how a public school teaches their child."'56 The 
court concluded that the due process clause did "not give 
plaintiffs the degree of control over their children's education 
that their requested relief seeks."57 
The Parker court also considered and rejected a combined 
due process and free exercise claim. ss The basis for this 
conclusion was that the plaintiffs had not presented an 
argument that there was any direct coercion. 59 In addition, the 
court also rejected the argument that the school was 
unconstitutionally indoctrinating the plaintiffs' children.60 The 
parents retained the opportunity to instruct their children 
differently.61 The "indoctrination" in Parker was relatively mild 
(the court here returned to the idea that there was no 
cognizable burden involved) and did not amount to "systemic 
indoctrination."62 According to the court, "ft]he reading by a 
teacher of one book, or even three, and even if to a young and 
impressionable child, does not constitute 'indoctrination."'63 
As Parker demonstrates, the current situation is quite 
bleak, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law. 64 There 
54. Jd. at 99-100. 
55. !d. at 100. 
56. /d. at 101 (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 101 F.:ld :lSI, :395 
(6th Cir. 2005)). 
57. Jd. at 102-03. 
58. ld. at 105. 
59. !d. 
60. Jd. 
61. /d. 
62. Jd. at 106. 
6:1. hi. at 107. 
61. There are other cases to the same effect. See, e.g., C.N. v. Hidgcwood Bd. of 
Educ., 180 F.8d 159 (:ld Cir. 2005); Leebacrt v. Harrington. :l:l2 F.:ld 1:31 (2d Cir. 200:3); 
Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.:1d 680 (7th Cir. 1991); Fields v. Palmdale 
Sch. Dist., 427 F.:ld 1197 (9th Cir.), amended and r('affirmed, 117 F.:ld 1187 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
2] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, EDUCATION 313 
seems to be little prospect of the United States Supreme Court 
changing this situation. 
III. ASSESSMENT 
This section of the paper will evaluate the courts' treatment 
of the free exercise (part A. 1.) and substantive due process 
(part A. 2.) claims. In my view, the recent court decisions 
reflect a defensible reading of the relevant constitutional 
provisions and precedents. I will then (part B.) evaluate the 
current legal situation from a parental rights perspective. I will 
also discuss (part C.) some solutions to this situation. 
A. Legal Doctrine 
1. Free Exercise 
Under current law, the free exercise claim of parents who 
object to the curriculum in the public schools is not strong. In 
general, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
provides very little judicially enforceable protection against 
state laws that mandate conduct that might be viewed as 
interfering with religious liberty. If the state requirement is a 
'"neutral law of general applicability,"'65 then (under current 
law) there is no realistic argument that the Constitution 
provides any basis to resist the mandate. 
The leading case is Employment Division v. Smith.66 Smith 
involved two individuals who were denied unemployment 
compensation because of work-related misconduct. 67 The 
workers were fired from their jobs with a drug rehabilitation 
organization due to their use of peyote, an illegal drug, even 
though they used peyote for religious purposes.68 The United 
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 
concluded that Oregon could "include religiously inspired 
peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibitions 
on use of that drug .... "69 To allow an exemption from laws 
65. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 191 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252, 26:3 n.:l (1982) (Stevens, .J., concurring)). 
66. Id. 
67. Jd. at 871. 
68. Jd. 
69. Id. 
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prohibiting "socially harmful conduct"70 would allow an 
individual with a religious objection to such laws "'to become a 
law unto himself."'71 
Under this approach, so long as the state mandate is a 
neutral law of general applicability, then there is no prospect of 
a court finding that someone with a religious objection to the 
mandate is exempted from the mandate. 
One seeking an exemption from such a mandate would be 
limited to seeking an exemption from the legislature. 72 Justice 
Scalia noted that "leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in."73 He concluded, 
though, "that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which conscience 
is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs."74 
Under this view, the right of parents to opt-out of an 
objectionable portion of the curriculum would fail. Smith is a 
controversial ruling but I believe that it was correctly decided. 
The argument for a constitutionally compelled exemption ought 
to fail. 
I think that, properly interpreted, the free exercise clause 
only prohibits laws that intentionally discriminate against 
religion, not laws that have the effect of interfering with the 
free exercise of religion.75 This view of the free exercise clause 
is the one with the most support in the text and history of the 
Constitution76 and with the current emphasis in constitutional 
law on the almost always decisive importance of legislative 
purpose. 77 It is also the view that has prevailed for most of the 
long history of judicial interpretation of the free exercise 
clause. The exception, of course, was the period between 1963 
and 1990 (during the Sherbert- Yoder era) but it is important to 
70. ld. at 8il5. 
71. !d. (quoting J{cynolds v. United States, 91-l U.S. ];15, 167 (li'l79)). 
72. !d. at 890. 
73. ld. 
71. !d. 
75. See Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1 :l!l. 
76. ld. 
77. /d. 
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note that that relatively brief interlude did not provide 
significant protection for religious practice. 78 
There is some room to argue that the basic approach in 
Smith (no exemption from a neutral law of general 
applicability) does not apply. If the public school curriculum 
was not truly a "neutral law of general applicability," then 
Smith's restrictive rule would not apply. But if the school 
imposed an across the board requirement that students 
participate in the curriculum, then Smith will control. There is 
also a potential argument that the parents with a religious 
objection to the public school curriculum can establish a so-
called hybrid rights claim. 79 This argument, which has recently 
been described by a leading scholar in this area as of "limited 
practical significance,"80 is unlikely to provide support for a 
claim when the free exercise or substantive due process claims 
would not succeed independently. 
In theory, there might be an argument that the "my way or 
the highway" situation creates a burden on the free exercise of 
religion. Parents who want to exercise their constitutional right 
to send their children to a religious school are faced with the 
choice of foregoing a valuable public benefit (a free public 
education) or violating what for some may be a religious 
obligation to choose religious schooling. I think it is fair to view 
this as a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right. 81 
There is very little prospect, however, that the federal courts 
will accept this argument. Recent Establishment Clause 
decisions make it possible for the government to provide 
assistance (such as vouchers) that enables certain parents to 
choose a private education, but, as decisions such as Locke v. 
Davey make clear,82 this is viewed as a matter of legislative 
grace and not as constitutional mandate. This failure is 
78. A careful review of the cases reveals that under Sherbert and Yoder review 
was "strict in theory but feeble in fact." Christopher L. Eis!,rruber & Lawnmce G. Sager, 
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.I{EV. 1215, 1247 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
79. This was how the Smith Court distinguished Yoder. See Smith, 491 U.S. at 
881-82. There is a vast literature on hybrid rights. Sec, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J. 
Strang, When a "Rule" /Joesn't Rule: The failure of the Oregon l~mployment Division v. 
Smith "Hybrid Rixhts Exception," 108 PENN. ST. L. I{EV. 578 (20D:1). 
80. DANII<;L 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 107 (2d ed. 
2009). 
81. See Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 175. 
82. Locke v. Davey, 510 U.S. 712 (2001). 
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lamentable but I do not think there is any prospect of a court 
finding that the current situation is unconstitutional. 
2. Substantive Due Process 
The recent courts that have considered parental rights 
arguments in disputes about the curriculum in public schools 
have rejected the substantive due process arguments. Despite 
the general support for a parental right to control education, 
most courts have interpreted this general right not to extend to 
the particular choice of a parent to opt-out of a portion of the 
public school curricul urn. 83 
In my view, this conclusion is probably correct as a matter 
of due process. The whole idea of substantive due process ought 
to be rejected.84 Meyer and Pierce were Lochne/'5-era decisions 
that relied on the doctrine of substantive due process. Although 
there were religious aspects to these decisions, Meyer and 
Pierce were decided before the Court had incorporated the 
religion clauses and the decisions were clearly based on 
substantive due process. With the repudiation of Lochner, these 
decisions, to the extent that they depend solely on the due 
process argument, ought to have been abandoned as well. 
Even if the whole doctrine of substantive due process ought 
not to be rejected, it is probably true that the substantive due 
process "right" involved ought not to extend to the parental 
choice involved. There is a significant debate about how to 
define the scope of the rights protected by the doctrine of 
substantive due process. 86 The narrow approach to this issue 
reflected in cases such as Washington u. Glucksberg87 is the 
most defensible. Yet, this approach likely provides little 
support for a claim to opt-out of a portion of the public school 
curriculum. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Fields u. Palmdale 
8::3. See, e.g, Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 117 F.:ld 1187. 1189-90 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
84. See RichardS. Myers, The End of Substantive /Jue Process(, 15 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 557 (1988). Nut see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Oriuinalist /Jefense of 
Substantive Due Process: Mauna Carta, Hiuher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 58 EMORY L..J. 5il5 (2009). 
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 15 (1905). 
86. See generally Richard S. Myers, Pope John Paul /!, Freedom, and 
Constitutional Law, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 61, 62-77 (2007) (discussing the dPbate about 
the differing understandings of substantive chw process). 
87. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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School District,'I'.X the "Meyer-Pierce right ... does not include 
the 'right to restrict the flow of information in the public 
schools.' ... Indeed, parents 'do not have a fundamental ... 
right generally to direct how a public school teaches their 
child.'"x9 In considering this argument, the courts examine 
whether the claimed right is deeply rooted in our nation's 
history and tradition. Parents do, it is true, have some limited 
opportunity to opt-out of the public school curriculum (this is 
typically permitted by state statutes dealing with sex 
education90) but I do not think this would support a more 
general right to opt-out. 
There is some argument for a broader approach to 
substantive due process. The Court does not always limit the 
scope of the doctrine to specifically defined rights with deep 
historical rights. 91 It is possible to generalize from the broad 
language in Yoder to support the parental right involved in 
these curriculum cases. In Yoder, the Court stated: "The 
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong 
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of 
their children. This primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate 
as an enduring American tradition."92 It is not too great a leap 
from this approach to the right claimed by the parents in cases 
such as Parker. For this argument to succeed, courts would 
have also have to take a different approach to the burden issue 
than the courts did in cases such as Mozert, Brown, and Parker. 
The courts do in certain contexts demonstrate more sensitivity 
to the burdens placed upon those asserting constitutional 
claims (e.g., in the Establishment Clause cases involving 
religious exercises in public schools or the display of religious 
symbols93) and so there is some hope that this argument might 
prevail. I believe, however, that the clear direction of federal 
88. 127 F. :3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), amended and reaffirmed, 14 7 F.3d 1187 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
89. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 117 F.:id 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
90. See Kevin Rogers & Richard Fossey symposium piece. 
91. See Myers, supra note 81, at 67-72. 
92. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 106 U.S. 205, 2:12 (1972). 
9:1. See Myers, Civic Virtue, supra note 1, at 85; Myers, J>arental Control, supra 
note 1, at 1:!7. 
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courts of appeals decisions on this topic indicates that there is 
little likelihood of this broader argument prevailing. 
B. Evaluation 
The current legal situation with regard to parental control 
over education is troublesome. The current legal approach is 
heavily weighted towards state power. As one commentator 
noted in defending the Mozert case: 
[T]he entire concept of compulsory education is based upon 
the assumption that there are times when the state rather 
than the parent may decide what perspectives the child 
confronts. Although society normally assumes that parents 
are best able to determine and do what is best for their child, 
compulsory education traditionally has been justified as a 
mechanism to expose children to ideas that will enable them 
to advance beyond the home and transcend the prejudices of 
the past. [According to this commentator,] [t]o compel 
education, especially education under state control or 
supervision, is to assert that the state-rather than parents-
ultimately should decide what is best for children. 94 
I think it is important to recognize this reality. There is 
inevitably a fair amount of compulsion in the public schools.95 
And, because of inequities in funding, many parents do not 
have a realistic option to avoid the public schools by sending 
their children to private schools or by exercising the choice to 
home school. 96 
My perspective on these issues is informed by Catholic 
social thought, which takes a very different approach. The 
Church emphasizes the primary rights of parents, the 
importance of the doctrine of subsidiarity, and a sensitivity to 
91. Stanley Ingber, Reli!{ion or Jdeolo!{y: A Needed Clarification of the Reli!{ion 
Clauses, 11 STAN. L. H":v. 2:3:3, 298 (191l9) (footnotes omitted). For a commentary on the 
hazards of this sort of strong emphasis on state control over education, see Michael A 
Scaperlanda, Producing 'l'rousered Apes in Dwyer:~ Totalitarian State, 7 TEX. RIW. L. & 
POL. 1 73 (2002); Michael i\. Scaperlanda, Realism, Freedom, and the !nte!{ral 
Development of the Human Person: A Catholic View of 8ducation, 11 .J. CA'J'H. LECAL 
STUD. 65 (2005). 
95. Myers, Civic Virtue, supra note L at s:l. 
96. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 17:l-76. 
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the impact of funding_97 The Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith summarized Church teaching in this fashion: 
The task of educating belongs fundamentally and primarily to 
the family. The function of the State is subsidiary: its role is 
to guarantee, protect, promote and supplement. Whenever the 
State lays claim to an educational monopoly, it oversteps its 
rights and offends justice. It is parents who have the right to 
choose the school to which they send their children and the 
right to set up and support educational centres in accordance 
with their own beliefs. The State cannot without injustice 
merely tolerate so-called private schools. Such schools render 
a public service and therefore have a right to financial 
assistance. 9X 
The Church's approach to parental control of education 
supports a parental right to opt-out of a portion of the 
curriculum. The 1983 Charter of the Rights of the Family 
stated: "Parents have the right to ensure that their children 
are not compelled to attend classes which are not in agreement 
with their own moral and religious convictions."99 The Church's 
social teaching properly regards the "my way or the highway" 
approach reflected in the constitutional law of the United 
States as an injustice. As the Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church summarizes this point: 
Public authorities must see to it that "public subsidies are so 
allocated that parents are truly free to exercise this right 
without incurring unjust burdens. Parents should not have to 
sustain, directly or indirectly, extra charges which would 
deny or unjustly limit the exercise of this freedom." The 
refusal to provide public economic support to non-public 
schools that need assistance and that render a service to civil 
society is to be considered an injustice. 100 
97. See !{i'nerally Patrick McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Societies: The 
Case of Lasallians, Families, Schools-and the Poor, 45 ,J. CATH. LECAL STUD. 131 
(2006). 
98. The Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Christian Freedom 
and Liberation #91 (1986), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/ 
documents/rc __ con_ cfaith doc_19860:l22_freedom -liheration_en.html. 
99. Charter of the Rights of the Family, art. 5(c) (198:3), http://www.vatican.va/ 
roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documcnts/rc_pc_family _doc_198:l1 022_family-
rights_en.html. See also Pontifical Council for the Family, The Family and Human 
Rights (1999), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/ 
documcnts/rc_pc_family _doc_20001115family-human-rights_en.html. 
100. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine 
of the Church #211 (2004) (quoting The Charter of the Hights of the Family, art. 5(h) 
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There would of course be limits to the parental right. The 
Church's teaching does not regard rights as absolute. 101 But 
the limits would need to be quite narrow. In Yoder, the Court 
mentioned that "the power of the parent ... may be subject to 
limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will 
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have potential for 
significant social burdens." 102 Yet, the cases seem to be far 
more deferential to state power, at least when parents have not 
opted out of the public schools. I would take the view that the 
state ought to be able to intervene when there has been a 
serious showing that parental choices were causing harm. 103 
C. Solutions 
1. Rebuild culture 
The problem presented for parents whose children attend 
public schools is that there will inevitably be clashes over basic 
issues. The best long-term solution is to rebuild the culture so 
that these clashes are minimized. 104 The situation in Parker is 
only presented because significant segments of the population 
believe it is a good idea to promote the legitimacy of same-sex 
marriage. Interestingly, the amici in Parker were worried 
about the exodus from the classrooms if the plaintiffs in Parker 
were granted relief. 1 05 Apparently that is due to their 
recognition that not everyone agrees with that moral position. 
This particular problem (with parents objecting to the 
promotion of same sex marriage) would not arise if a 
traditional understanding of marriage were restored. But I am 
not optimistic about that strategy in the short run. Because of 
the increasing pluralism in our society, the strategy of trying to 
build up a proper understanding of morality is not likely to 
(198:3) ), http://www. vatican. va/roman_ curi a/pon ti fica!_ cou nci I s/justpeace/ docum en ts/rc_ 
pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html. 
1 OJ. See Hi chard S. Myers, Current Legal Issues Regarding Rights of Conscience in 
Health Care, 16 ,JOSEI'HINUM J. THEOLOOY :l91, 10:l-01 (2009) (noting the Catholic 
Church's understanding of the limits on the right of religious liberty). 
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 106 U.S. 205, 2:J:l-:i1 (1972). 
103. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 176. 
101. See generally Myers, Conscience. supra note 1, at 1 :n-:lil; Myers, supra note 
84, at 405. 
105. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.:ld 87, 96 n.8 (2008) ("Amici, however, argue that 
such exemptions would significantly burden the schoob because (1) there would be an 
exodus from classrooms if plaintiffs received the relief requested and that (2) this in 
turn would send a message that children of same-sex partners are inferior."). 
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succeed any time soon. Some of these problems are less likely 
to arise in certain communities. There are many parts of the 
country where support for same-sex marriage is not 
widespread. It is a good thing, I believe, that we still have a 
significant amount of decentralization with regard to schooling. 
But this does not deal with the problems for parents who are 
faced with the dilemmas faced by the parents in Parker. Their 
plight would be best solved by restoring a traditional 
understanding of marriage, although that is a long-term 
cultural strategy. 
2. Other remedies 
In the meantime, because the federal constitutional 
arguments are so weak, other remedies need to be pursued. It 
is often possible to obtain sub-constitutional exemptions. It is 
worth recalling that legislative protection for conscientious 
objection to government mandates is long-standing and, I 
think, far more secure. 106 I think that is true in many contexts 
and also in the particular issue under review-the area of 
parental rights. The federal constitutional objections to sex 
education are typically rejected but there are statutory 
protections for parental rights in most states. 107 We sometimes 
forget that decisions such as Smith have been reversed by 
legislation. 1 ox In general, religious claimants fare better 
outside the courts. 109 This is a second-best strategy, as I 
pointed out in a recent paper on health care rights of 
conscience, 110 but such a strategy is necessary to protect 
religious freedom while the long-term cultural strategy is 
pursued. 
106. Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1::l5. 
107. See Rogers & Fossey symposium piece. See also Erie A DeGroff, Parental 
Riuhts and Public School Curricula: Reuisitinf{ Mozert After 20 years, il8 J.L. & EDUC. 
8:l. 129-:lO (2009) (noting that public schools often have opt-out provisions and that 
these seem to work without significant difficulty). 
108. Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1 :l5. 
109. Myers, Conscience, supra note 1, at 1 :l5. The legal status of home schooling is 
a good example. Home schooling advocates did not have a lot of success in the courts. 
See id. at 1:15 n.81; Myers, Parental Control. supra note 1, at 1.15-:l6. However, as a 
result primarily of legislative changes, home schooling is now quite secure. Myers, 
Conscience, supra note 1, at 1 :l5 n.81. 
110. Myers, supra note 81, at 107. 
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3. More equitable funding 
Perhaps a better strategy is to pursue genuine pluralism 
with regard to education. This would require a more equitable 
funding system. 111 I am not optimistic about the success of this 
approach, either as a matter of constitutional law or as a 
prudential policy option. Perhaps the serious, increasing 
clashes about same-sex marriage will prompt some movement 
in favor of school choice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current legal situation involving parental rights with 
regard to controlling the education of their children is quite 
bleak as a matter of federal constitutional law. The only real 
constitutional right of parents is to opt-out of the public school 
system altogether. Parents have very little right to opt-out of 
particular courses or classes, even when such curriculum 
offerings interfere with the religious freedom of parents and 
their children. 
The solutions to this plight are not very promising. The 
existing legal doctrines do not offer much support and, in any 
event, I do not believe that either the Free Exercise or Due 
Process clauses, properly interpreted, should offer much 
support. The solutions I mentioned-rebuilding the culture, 
pursuing other remedies for conscience, and encouraging an 
emphasis on school choice with a focus on equitable funding-
are more long-term. None of these seems to offer much of a 
prospect of immediate relief, although the legislative 
exemption strategy offers some prospect of success. Perhaps, 
though, the recent intense controversies about same-sex 
marriage will prompt an increasing focus on school choice. 
111. Myers, School Choice, supra note 1, at 17:l-76. 
